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The parties in O’Connor v. Galka shared one child and had previously resolved their issues pursuant to two Consent Orders. However, the Respondent mother later brought a motion to change several of the provisions in the Consent Orders. As a result, the court had to examine multiple issues relating to parenting but focused largely on the mother’s request to increase the father’s responsibility for Section 7 special expenses.

Background

Prior to the motion to change, the Applicant father and Respondent mother consented to two Orders that addressed the issues arising from their matrimonial matter.

The parties were common law partners who shared one daughter. After separation, the daughter lived primarily with the mother and required child support payments from the father.

In 2015, the first Consent Order largely addressed financial issues such as ordering table child support that would only be varied in the event of a material change in circumstance. The Order also covered Section 7 expenses and included examples of activities that would be considered a special expense, such as camp, tutoring or private school.

In 2021, the second Consent Order further addressed Section 7 expenses after the parties’ child began attending a private school. The father agreed to pay tuition for the child’s private school, but not any collateral expenses associated with the school such as uniforms or technology. The parties also agreed that the father’s contributions to any Section 7 expenses would be capped at $15,000.

Analysis

The Respondent mother ultimately brought a motion to change the two Consent Orders.

Regarding child support, the mother wanted to increase the cap on the Section 7 expenses to $52,513 and sought an advance payment for these expenses. This amount did not include tuition and collateral expenses for the school which the mother wanted the father to pay in addition to the $52,513.

The first issue regarding child support that the court examined is whether the father should be required to make an immediate advance payment of $10,000. To address this issue, Justice Rhinelander determined that the mother had overspent on fees related to Section 7 expenses in 2023, and this was why she sought an advance for 2024. However, she also noted that the mother made no effort to budget and had difficulty managing her finances. This was not a reason to order an immediate payment from the father.

The next issue was whether there had been a material change in circumstances that warranted an increase for Section 7 expenses.

Here, Justice Rhinelander noted that Section 7 expenses were capped at $15,000 per the second Consent Order that both parties agreed to. This amount was also in addition to the private school tuition the father paid. The father was never in agreement that the child attend private school, but the mother encouraged the child to apply anyways. Despite his disagreement, the father agreed to cover tuition and the capped Section 7 expenses under the Consent Order. As a result, Justice Rhinelander decided that the father was not responsible for covering any additional expenses other than the amounts previously agreed to.

The mother argued that the Section 7 expenses had increased by up to 400% since the Consent Order. However, Justice Rhinelander decided that many of the expenses the mother listed were not Section 7. For example, the mother considered her costs of preparing the child to go on vacation with the father as a Section 7 expense. The mother also argued that the cost of the child’s figure skating lessons had increased threefold in cost. Justice Rhinelander considered the increase to be unreasonable given that the child had been skating since she was four, and the costs had never jumped so much. As a result, the court considered many of the expenses unreasonable for the father to cover.

Justice Rhinelander ultimately decided there was no material change in circumstance. Rather, the mother continued to enrol the child in multiple activities without budgeting for what could actually be covered by the father’s support obligations.

Conclusion

In O’Connor v. Galka, the court was strict as it considered whether a material change in circumstance had occurred warranting an adjustment to Consent Orders.

On the outset, Justice Rhinelander noted how the parties had previously agreed to a cap on Section 7 expenses a few years prior to the motion to change. The mother argued that the child’s Section 7 expenses increased exponentially, however the court disagreed as to the reasoning for the increase. Justice Rhinelander decided that the increase in expenses was not because of a material change in circumstance, but rather a result of poor financial planning and budgeting. The court did not find these expenses to be reasonable, and as a result, not the responsibility of the father to cover.